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Commentary on Attorney General v X 
 
SHEELAGH MCGUINNESS 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This commentary reflects on the feminist judgment of Ruth Fletcher in the landmark 
case of Attorney General v X.1 This case involved an attempt to prevent a 14-year-old 
girl who was pregnant as a result of being raped from travelling to England in order to 
access abortion care.  
It is impossible to engage with this decision without a broader consideration of 
the harm that is wrought on the lives of women in Ireland by the Eighth amendment 
to the Irish Constitution: Article 40.3.3. The content of my commentary uses two 
frames of analysis developed in the work of academic Robin West.2 First, I consider 
West’s concept of ‘gendered harms’ in the spheres of reproduction and pregnancy. 
Joanne Conaghan summarises the concept of ‘gendered harms’ as ‘but one way of 
recognising that injury has a social as well as an individual dimension’ and an 
acknowledgement of the way in which harms can impact particular group members.3 
Legal systems can compound and legitimate harms that are experienced 
disproportionately or solely by women, especially in the sphere of reproduction.4 This 
harm plays out differently depending on how gender interacts with other social 
dynamics such as ethnicity in the regulation of reproduction. 5  As is detailed by 
Fletcher J in her analysis, Article 40.3.3 is a clear instance of law’s ability to be an 
instrument of harm. Second, I illustrate the way in which Fletcher J’s decision is an 
example of what West describes as ‘progressive constitutionalism’, which contrasts 
with the ‘conservative constitutionalism’ evident in much of the legal discussion of 
40.3.3. West suggests that it is ‘[o]nly by reconceptualising the Constitution as a 
source of inspiration and guidance for legislation, rather than a superstructural 
constraint on adjudication, [that we] can we make good on its richly progressive 
promise’.6 Fletcher J, in keeping with the aims of the feminist judgment endeavour, 
confines herself to a realistic adjudicative role that remains faithful to the impartial 
and neutral role of the judge. In doing so she accepts the legal form of the judge but 
her judicial craft is an instance of ‘controlled creativity’ that: 
                                                        
1 Attorney General v X [1992] 1 IR 1. 
2 Robin West, Caring for Justice (New York, New York University Press, 1997) (‘gendered harm’); 
‘Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism’ (1989-1990) 88 Michigan Law Review 641–721 
(‘progressive constitutionalism’). 
3 Joanne Conaghan ‘Gendered Harms and the Law of Tort: Remedying (Sexual) Harassment’ (1996) 
16(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 407-31. 
4 West, above n 2 (‘gendered harm’). 
5 See Dorothy Roberts, Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty (New 
York, Vintage, 19970); Jael Silliman, Marlene Gerber Fried, Loretta Ross and Elena Gutierrez, 
Undivided Rights: Women of Color Organize for Reproductive Justice (Cambridge MA, South End 
Press, 2004); Ruth Fletcher ‘Reproducing Irishness: Race, Gender, and Abortion Law’ (2005) 17(3) 
Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 365-404. 
6 West, above n 2 (‘progressive constitutionalism’) 651. Although West is speaking here in the US 
context, this framing applies well to Fletcher J’s engagement with the Irish Constitution. 
  
 
views law as an open set of possibilities, and thus a vehicle for change, 
growth, and authenticity, rather than the static product of an unambiguous past 
historical process, and thus a vehicle for obedience.7 
 
In her re-visioning of the decision, Fletcher J harnesses the disruptive potential of the 
Constitution to address the power imbalances perpetuated by Article 40.3.3. 
Contrasting her judgment to the original ‘expose[s] the contingency and biases of 
existing decisions and disrupt[s] the unique authority of the courts and legal decision-
making’.8 In my commentary I bring together the work of Fletcher J, the feminist 
judge, and Ruth Fletcher, the feminist academic, to critique the existence and impact 
of 40.3.3. Reading the judgment in light of Fletcher’s academic work merges aspects 
of critique and law reform which are central to the feminist judging methodology. 
 
 
The Emergence of Article 40.3.3 
 
In order to understand the decision in Attorney General v X it is necessary to consider 
the historical and jurisprudential context within which the case arose. At that time 
abortion in Ireland was regulated within a web of Constitutional, legislative, and 
common law provisions originating with the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 
(OAPA), sections 58 and 59, which prohibit procuring or attempting to procure a 
miscarriage.9 Sections 58 and 59 of the OAPA were reaffirmed in the Health (Family 
Planning) Act 1979. 10  In England, the OAPA was interpreted to allow for an 
exception to the general prohibition when the life or health (physical or mental) of the 
pregnant woman were likely to be severely impacted.11 However, it is clear that even 
prior to the insertion of 40.3.3 into the Irish Constitution, such an interpretation was 
unlikely to be permissible in Ireland.12 Evidence for this proposition can be traced 
through the statements of Kenny J in Ryan v Attorney General 13  to its clearest 
exposition in the judgment of Walsh J in G v An Bord Uchtála, when he held that a 
child: 
 
has the right to life itself and the right to be guarded against all threats directed 
to its existence whether before or after birth The right to life necessarily 
implies the right to be born…14 
 
Notwithstanding the prevailing jurisprudence, a concern emerged that the 
Constitution could provide an avenue through which abortion would become 
                                                        
7 ibid, 688 
8 Rosemary Hunter ‘The Power of Feminist Judgments’ (2012) 20(2) Feminist Legal Studies 137-48. 
9 James Kingston, Anthony Whelan and Ivana Bacik, Abortion and the Law (Dublin, Round Hall Sweet 
and Maxwell, 1997) ch 1. It should be noted that the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013 
repealed ss 58 and 59 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, however, s 22 of this latter statute 
recriminalises the destruction of unborn human life. 
10 Health (Family Planning) Act 1979, s 10. 
11 R v Bourne [1939] 1 KB 687. 
12 See Kingston, Whelan and Bacik, above n 9. 
13 Ryan v Attorney General [1965] IR 294. 
14 G v An Bord Uchtála [1980] IR 32; see also the obiter dicta of Keane J in the case of Society for the 
Protection of the Unborn Child (Ireland) Ltd (SPUC) v Grogan and Ors [1989] IR 753. 
  
permissible in Ireland.15 Unease grew at the prospect that abortion might fall within 
the sphere of Constitutional privacy rights as happened in the USA in Roe v Wade.16 
In 1974, the Irish Supreme Court in the decision in McGee v Attorney General had 
found that the right to marital privacy was implicit in the Constitution and as such 
married couples should be allowed to import contraception for personal use. 17 
Conservative lawyer William Binchy stated that ‘the concept of privacy espoused by 
that decision is a timebomb which, with changing attitudes, may yet explode in a 
manner which most of our citizens …. would deeply regret’.18 Here Binchy espouses 
the sort of constitutional conservatism that West places in opposition to the 
constitutional progressivism of which I suggest Fletcher J offers an example. Binchy 
is concerned that the ‘‘majority’ carries the danger of being or becoming an 
irresponsible and excessively egalitarian, or ‘leveling,’ mechanism bent on the 
redistribution of social wealth, power, and prestige’. 19  In order to fend off the 
possibility of abortion as a personal right, Binchy and others established the Pro-Life 
Amendment Campaign, which successfully lobbied for a Constitutional clause that 
guaranteed specific and explicit protection for unborn foetal life: the Eighth 
amendment to the Irish Constitution.  
 
  
The Harm of Article 40.3.3 
 
Carol Smart warns of the juridogenic potential of law. She characterises the ‘term 
juridogenic to apply to law as a way of conceptualising the harm that law may 
generate as a consequence of its operations’. 20  Article 40.3.3, and its subsequent 
interpretation in the Courts, is a clear example of what Smart is here referring to. 
Fletcher summarises the situation as follows: 
 
Through constitutionalisation, the right to life of the "unborn" had been legally 
recognised as an important interest of Irish society. … through the judicial 
interpretation of Article 40.3.3, that right had acquired a status that rendered it 
more important to Irish society than other constitutionally endorsed interests.21  
 
This amendment, and the interpretation of it, have served to perpetuate and assure 
harms to women; it is an instance of law purporting to legitimate gendered harm. 
In claiming to find legitimacy, Article 40.3.3 rests on an antagonistic framing, 
meaning the Constitution creates a conflict model of maternal-foetal relations. It gives 
rise to a legal culture in Ireland that has attributed subjectivity to the foetus. Susan 
Bordo presents the effect of such framing as follows: 
 
                                                        
15 Kingston, Whelan and Bacik, above n 9; see also Ivana Bacik ‘Legislating for Article 40.3.3’ (2013) 
3(1) Irish Journal of Legal Studies 18-35. 
16 Roe v Wade 410 US 113 [1973]. 
17 On McGee, see further this collection, ch 5. 
18 William Binchy ‘Marital Privacy and Family Law: A Reply to Mr. O'Reilly’ (1977) 66 Studies: An 
Irish Quarterly Review 330-335, 333.  
19 West, above n 2 (‘progressive constitutionalism’) 645. 
20 Carol Smart Feminism and the Power of Law (New York, Routledge; 1989) 12 
21 Ruth Fletcher ‘“Pro-Life” Absolutes, Feminist Challenges: The Fundamentalist Narrative of Irish 
Abortion Law 1986-1992’ (1998) 36(1) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1-62. 
  
The essence of the pregnant woman… is her biological, purely mechanical 
role in preserving the life of another. In her case, this is the given value, 
against which her claims to subjectivity must be rigorously evaluated, and 
they will usually be found wanting insofar as they conflict with her life-
support function. In the face of such conflict, her valuations, choices, 
consciousness are expendable.22 
 
Through the attribution of subjectivity, the status of the foetus is elevated to that of a 
separate and distinct individual of equal moral worth to the woman. That this conflict 
model of maternal/foetal relations was the impetus for the litigation in X v AG is 
evident in the following statement from Harry Whelehan; the Attorney General who 
initiated the proceedings. During an interview for the Scannal programme, Whelan 
was asked about his perspective on the decision looking back to which he said:  
 
I don’t want this to sound harsh but where the mother of the child, who is 
entitled to have its life protected, decides to seek an abortion the only 
mechanism in our system is for the attorney general to intervene and make a 
case for the child to be born alive.23 
 
Here Whelehan is advocating for an approach which affords protection to the 
foetus through the constitutionalisation of foetal rights. 24  Constructions of 
maternal/foetal conflict acknowledge the embodied nature of pregnancy only to the 
extent that the pregnant woman is viewed as a threat to the foetus. This framing leads 
to the position of the woman as an aggressor and the foetus as an innocent party rather 
than a dependent, such as was evident in the approach of some of the original 
judgments in X. As Bordo summarises: ‘as the personhood of the pregnant woman has 
been drained from her and her function as fetal incubator activated, the subjectivity of 
the fetus has been elevated’.25 Indeed it is interesting to note that one of the key 
legitimating narratives associated with the decision in X v AG is that of her innocence. 
This is vividly summarised by Fletcher as follows: 
 
A famous cartoon in the Irish Times in February 1992 clearly depicts the 
enforcement of the Eighth amendment in nationalist terms. It represents X, 
who was stopped by injunction from travelling to England for an abortion, as a 
young girl with a teddy bear on a fenced-in map of the Republic of Ireland. 
The cartoon clearly plays with Irish nationalist iconography by describing the 
child as being interned in the twenty-six counties of Ireland as a result of the 
High Court decision in the X case. By depicting the X case decision in terms of 
Ireland's virtual imprisonment of a young vulnerable child, the cartoon 
criticises the Irish state in terms that used to be reserved for the British state 
when it imprisoned Northern Irish republicans without trial.26     
                                                        
22 Susan Bordo, Unbearable Weight Feminism: Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body (Berkeley, 
CA, University of California Press, 1993) 79. 
23 Scannal programme, available at: www.rte.ie/tv/scannal/xcase.html (last accessed 27 March 2016); 
as detailed in The Sunday Times ‘X case judge Harry Whelehan: I was only doing my duty’ (21 
February 2010). Available at:  http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/ireland/article7035006.ece  
(last accessed 27 March 2016). 
24 Fletcher, above n 20; Fiona de Londras ‘Constitutionalizing Fetal Rights: A Salutary Tale from 
Ireland’ (2015) 22(2) Michigan Journal of Gender and Law 243-89. 
25 Bordo, above n 22, 85. 
26 Fletcher, above n 5 384. 
  
 
I will return to the linkage between Irish nationalism and reproductive politics 
below.27 For now, I wish to focus on how the acceptability of letting X travel to have 
a termination is reliant on a framing which reduces the ‘threat’ that X is seen to pose. 
She is depicted as another ‘innocent’. The outcome of this case cannot be understood 
as ‘empowering’; rather the justifications invoked legitimate and reproduce structural 
subordination of women in being reliant on her diminished agency.  
 
 
Attorney General v X Reimagined 
 
Article 40.3.3 therefore serves as a tool of subjugation and oppression. Furthermore, it 
is not just pregnant women who are impacted by this provision, but rather all those 
with the capacity to become pregnant. Article 40.3.3 ensures that this group lives with 
the spectre of the unborn; their agency is contingent on a state (pregnancy) that they 
may never enter. As Drucilla Cornell tells us: 
 
The very constitution of selfhood cannot be separated from the protection of 
the future projections of the woman’s self as a whole body. The threat takes 
effect before any woman actually has to face an unwanted pregnancy. Here we 
have an important example of how the symbolisation of a woman’s “sex” has 
a constitutive effect on what we have come to think of as selfhood. Not only is 
a woman’s individuality not just given, it is limited in its very definition by 
certain symbolisations of her “sex” in the law.28 
 
As is clear in the decision of Fletcher J, and the range of abortion and maternity care 
cases that have arisen since its insertion in the Constitution, Article 40.3.3 is an 
instrument of law with serious juridogenic effect: it ‘poses an impracticable burden on 
the woman’s rightful life’ and as such limits her capacity to act as a full citizen. The 
absence of access to safe and legal abortion services means the absence of full 
recognition of the bodily integrity of the pregnant woman. Again, in the words of 
Cornell: 
 
Understood through the rubric of bodily integrity, the wrong in denying a right 
to abortion is not a wrong to the “self,” but a wrong that prevents the 
achievement of the minimum conditions of individuation necessary for any 
meaningful concept of selfhood.29   
 
The first challenge then for Fletcher J’s feminist re-imagining is to respond to the 
limiting impact of Article 40.3.3. She does this by highlighting that even if women 
cannot ground a claim to access abortion based in dignity it is possible to limit the 
impact of Article 40.3.3 through the invocation of a range of other constitutionally 
protected rights. Specifically, Fletcher J rejects the ‘bright line’ distinction that has 
                                                        
27 See also Eithne Luibheid, ‘Sexual Regimes and Migration Controls: Reproducing the Irish Nation-
State in Transnational Contexts’ (2006) 83(1) Feminist Review 60-78; Siobhán Mulally ‘Debating 
Reproductive Rights in Ireland’ (2005) 27(1) Human Rights Quarterly 78-104. 
28 Drucilla Cornell, The Imaginary Domain: Abortion, Pornography and Sexual Harrassment (New 
York, Routledge 1995) 52. 
29 ibid 33. 
  
been drawn between ‘life’ and ‘health’ in Irish pregnancy and abortion jurisprudence. 
Here the feminist judge attempts to limit the juridogenic potential of Article 40.3.3 
not just with regard to access to abortion care but also to limit the detrimental effect 
that the Article has had on maternity services generally.30 In keeping with West’s 
account of progressive constitutionalism, Fletcher J here is interpreting the 
Constitution to ensure the minimum conditions for a flourishing or in Fletcher’s 
words ‘rightful’ life.31  
 Since its insertion in 1983, Article 40.3.3 has been interpreted in a range of 
cases related to access to abortion and maternity care as a mechanism through which 
the status of the foetus has been elevated to that of ‘super subject’. This elevation of 
the status of the foetus robs the pregnant woman of her own subjectivity and reduces 
her to the physicality of her role as foetal incubator.32 Again our feminist judge is 
both creative and subversive in her approach. She rejects the construction of the 
foetus as ‘super subject’ and emphasises the ‘life in being’ of the pregnant woman: 
 
The unborn’s right to life is to ‘bare’ biological life. That right may impose an 
obligation on others to support it, but when there is a conflict, the woman’s 
fuller, rightful life may merit more legal weight than the unborn’s bare life. 
 
Fletcher J restores the subjectivity of the pregnant woman and emphasises the 
contingent and dependent status of the foetus rejecting the hitherto ‘fundamentalist’ 
approach to valuing foetal life.33 This construction is not an attempt to denigrate the 
status of the foetus but rather demonstrates the reality that separated from the body of 
the pregnant woman the foetus has no possibility for selfhood, and in doing so 
emphasises that the well-being of the foetus cannot be disentangled from the well-
being of the pregnant woman ‘of whose body it is part’.34  
 
 
‘One step forward…’35 
 
In considering the progressive judgment of Fletcher J it is worth asking whether such 
a decision in 1992 would have prevented the series of terrible decisions which 
followed in its wake. Probably it would not have done, because to be successful it 
needs to be part of a broader socio-legal consensus that pregnant women’s right to life 
entitles them to more than bare existence.36 It is not just the existence of Article 
40.3.3 that diminishes the status of women but also the way in which it is interpreted. 
                                                        
30 For further detail on this see Máiréad Enright and Fiona de Londras, ‘“Empty Without and Empty 
Within”: the Unworkability of the Eighth Amendment after Savita Halappanavar and Miss Y’ (2014) 
20(2) Medico-Legal Journal of Ireland 85-92. 
31 West, above n 2 (‘progressive constitutionalism’) 697. 
32 A particularly egregious example of this is the case of PP v HSE [2014] IEHC 622 discussed in 
Máiréad Enright ‘PP v HSE: Practicability, Dignity and the Best Interests of the Unborn Child’ (26 
December 2014) Human Rights In Ireland. Available at: http://humanrights.ie/gender-sexuality-and-
the-law/pp-v-hse-futility-dignity-and-the-best-interests-of-the-unborn-child/ (last accessed 27 March 
2016). 
33 Fletcher, above n 20. 
34 Cornell, above n 27, 32.  
35 Mulally, above n 26. 
36 See further Reva Siegel ‘The Constitutionalization of Abortion’ in Rebecca Cook, Joanna Erdman 
and Bernard Dickens (eds) Abortion Law in Transnational Perspective: Cases and Controversies 
(Philadelphia, PA, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014) ch 1. 
  
In 1998 Fletcher published a detailed consideration of how the protection of the foetus 
as a fundamental value within the Irish legal system and within Irish society had 
created the conditions for such a case occurring. Fletcher sees the potential impact of 
X as drawing a line under the sort of ‘fundamentalist’ narratives that had defined 
litigation (and societal discourse) on 40.3.3 until this point. Fundamentalist narratives 
in this context are simply the absolutist expression of the ideal of protecting foetal life 
as a constitutional value above and beyond the protection of other values. She 
summarises the impact of this fundamentalist approach as follows: 
 
When the fundamentalist narrative assumed legal authority and became a legal 
narrative as well as a social narrative, the legal conditions were created that 
would give rise to the X case. …. By bringing "pro-life" absolutism to a 
climax, and thus exposing the actual consequences of legal endorsement of a 
fundamentalist narrative for women's lives, the X case also brought that legal 
narrative to a close and stripped fundamentalism of legal authority.37 
 
As has been discussed in this commentary the maternal/foetal conflict model of 
understanding the relationship between the foetus and the pregnant woman have the 
effect of foreclosing the possibility of equal consideration; when understood as being 
in opposition to each other the value of respecting one trumps the value of respecting 
the other. In conceptualising the pregnant woman and the foetus as separate and with 
the potential of competing interests we accept the fiction that in cases of conflict we 
are simply ‘balancing’ two sides equally. X v AG brought all of this to our attention: 
 
The violation of women's rights through the prioritisation of fetal life became 
tangible for the Irish public as it took shape in Irish law's victimisation of a 
particular young woman.38 
 
However, X v AG signifies only the possibility of a more progressive approach to 
understanding the relationship between the rights of the pregnant woman and the 
rights of the foetus in the context of 40.3.3. In a later article, published in 2005, 
Fletcher picks up on this analysis with a consideration of the circumstances and 
conditions that made the outcome in X v AG possible and she contrasts these with two 
other cases; the C case39 and the O case.40 I will focus primarily on the C case. The 
decisions in C and O evidence how the legacy of X v AG is not a legal and societal 
awakening about the value of equal citizenship and consequent limitations on the 
interpretation of 40.3.3. Rather the decisions (and the associated societal discourse) 
continue to diminish the subjectivity of the pregnant women involved and also of 
migrant women and those from minority ethnic groups. In her article, Fletcher 
describes the extent to which discourses which provided a legitimating narrative in X 
v AG were not applicable in C and O. Her analysis describes a failure of progressive 
thinking not just within the legal system but in society generally. 
The C case involved a 13-year-old who was pregnant as a result of rape. C was 
a member of the travelling community. C also wished to travel to England to have a 
termination but one of the distinguishing features of her situation and that of X was 
                                                        
37 Fletcher, above n 20, 8. 
38 ibid 58. 
39 A and B v Eastern Health Board [1997] IEHC 176. 
40 Baby O (Suing by Mother and Next Friend IAO) v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform 
[2002] IESC 53. 
  
that she had been taken into care following the rape. This meant that the Court did not 
just have to decide to let her travel to access abortion care but rather they had to 
positively assist her to do so, which they did. It may be imagined at this point that the 
outcome marks a progressive extension of X v AG. Although, as Fletcher details, there 
are progressive aspects to the judgment which could be co-opted in this way, this is 
ultimately not the driver for the outcome reached. As mentioned above, the discursive 
justifications for the outcome in X v AG were reliant on a depiction of X as a 
diminished subject, an innocent, and as such less of a threat to her foetus. While the 
discursive justifications for C are consistent in reproducing structures which diminish 
the subjectivity of women and girls, they do so in a different way. For C, she was not 
capable of constituting a threat – she was ‘unfit’. As Fletcher summarises: ‘While X 
was to be spared motherhood because of her innocence, C was to be spared 
motherhood because she was unfit for it.’41     
Pervasive in the consideration of the prospects for C and her ‘unborn child’ if 
the pregnancy were to continue is the undesirability of the Traveller lifestyle and 
consequent inability to control reproductive decision-making: 
 
[A] young Traveller woman was represented as a less worthy bearer of 
Irishness in circumstances that celebrated the modernity of the settled Irish 
population by contrasting it with the backwardness and excessive fertility of 
Irish Travellers.42    
 
In this case, concerns about the protection of foetal life are hierarchised through the 
lens of ethnicity and its contribution to Irishness. The facts of C highlight the 
increased burden experienced by women and girls of limited financial means and for 
whom travelling to access abortion is not straightforward. It also illustrates the 
complex and heightened possibilities for individuals who are marginalised in multiple 
ways to experience harm. These interactions culminate in the case of Miss Y.43 Miss 
Y’s story evidences the extent of the harm that can be experienced as a result of 
40.3.3 in a societal context that is suspicious of women, asylum seekers, and maternal 
decision making. Y was an asylum seeker who was pregnant as a result of rape in her 
country of origin; she found out that she was pregnant at a health check upon arriving 
into Ireland. Y was deeply distressed by the pregnancy and wished to have a 
termination. She was informed that this would not be possible in Ireland and she 
would need to travel to England – Y had neither the financial nor legal means to 
travel to England.44 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss this case in detail 
suffice to note that Y is transformed from a woman who is harmed through the refusal 
of care consequent to 40.3.3 to a woman who is harmed by enforced medical care in 
the interests of the foetus consequent to 40.3.3. Y is violated and harmed first through 
rape, then through enforced pregnancy, and finally through enforced medical 
treatment.  
                                                        
41 Fletcher, above n 5, 390. 
42 Fletcher, above n 5, 390. 
43Ms Y v Health Service Executive & Ors [2016] IEHC 136. See further Ruth Fletcher ‘Contesting the 
cruel treatment of abortion-seeking women’ (2014) 22(44) Reproductive Health Matters 10–21. 
44 Notwithstanding these barriers, under circumstances that still remain unclear, Miss Y manages to get 
a ferry to Liverpool only to be returned to Ireland upon her arrival there due to her lack of 
documentation; see Irish Times ‘Report on Ms Y case to include journey to Liverpool to seek abortion’ 
(7 November 2014). Available at: http://www.irishtimes.com/news/social-affairs/report-on-ms-y-case-
to-include-journey-to-liverpool-to-seek-abortion-1.1991580 (last accessed 25 March 2016). 
  
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
West describes the experience of rape and unwanted pregnancy as ‘defining harmful 
experiences for women’. 45  X, C and Y experienced both; the harm which X 
experienced under intense media and legal scrutiny is unimaginable. Subsequent to 
the reversal of the High Court injunction prohibiting her to leave Ireland, X travelled 
with her parents to England in order to have the termination she had first requested 
two months earlier. However, after undergoing chorionic villus sampling, in order to 
obtain genetic material which could be used in the prosecution of X’s rapist, X 
experienced a miscarriage.46 C did go on to have a termination.47 In sentencing her 
rapist Quirke J emphasised the grave harm he had caused not just in his violation of C 
but in also causing the death of a child by abortion.48 He thereby provided an example 
of the way in which abortion continues to be cast as an independent harm to a foetal 
subject, rather than necessary medical care for a pregnant woman. 
In his judgment in X  v AG McCarthy J stated: ‘[t]he failure of the Legislature 
to enact the appropriate legislation is no longer just unfortunate; it is inexcusable’.49 
Notwithstanding this declaration it was not until the passing of the Protection of Life 
During Pregnancy Act (PDLPA) 2013 that the Irish government ‘legislated for X’. 
Therefore, although in the wake of X v AG it was accepted that abortion was 
permissible when the life of the pregnant woman was threatened (including when the 
threat to life is from suicide) government inertia and unwillingness to confront the 
issue of abortion meant that how and when women are able to access abortion 
remained unclear.50 The failure to provide clarity to the law in this area has been 
emphasised over the years through a series of high profile cases including (but not 
limited to) the C case;51 Miss D’s case;52 D v Ireland;53 ABC v Ireland;54 the death of 
Savita Hallapanavar; and most recently the treatment of Ms Y.55 During this time 
McCarthy J’s sentiments have been echoed by many judges; most famously by 
Geoghegan J who expressed dissatisfaction that that the courts should be considered 
as ‘some kind of licensing authority for abortions’.56 However, as Marie Fox and 
Therese Murphy caution: 
 
                                                        
45 West, above n 2 (‘gendered harm’) ch 4. 
46Irish Independent ‘Whelehan 'regrets' hurt caused in X case’ (21 February 2010). Available at:  
http://www.independent.ie/irish-news/whelehan-regrets-hurt-caused-in-x-case-26634293.html (last 
accessed 27 March 2016). 
47 Irish Independent ‘C-Case mum: I grieve for my lost baby every day’ (5 May 2013). Available at: 
 http://www.independent.ie/lifestyle/health/ccase-mum-i-grieve-for-my-lost-baby-every-day-
29241584.html (last accessed 27 March 2016). 
48 Irish Independent, ‘Judge jails C case rapist for “dreadful evil act”’ (18 December 1998). Available 
at: http://www.independent.ie/irish-news/judge-jails-c-case-rapist-for-dreadful-evil-act-26165826.html 
(last accessed 27 March 2016). 
49 Attorney General v X [1992] 1 IR 1, 147. 
50 For a full discussion of the journey from X to the PDLPA, see Bacik, above n 15. 
51 Above n 39. 
52  For details, see Irish News ‘Miss D: my story’ (12 May 2007). Available at: 
http://www.independent.ie/irish-news/miss-d-my-story-26288744.html (last accessed 27 March 2016). 
53 D v Ireland, App No 26499/02 (28 June 2006). 
54 A, B and C v Ireland [2011] 53 EHRR 13. 
55 For a discussion of these cases see Fletcher, above n 43. 
56 A and B v Eastern Health Board [1998] 1 IR IR 464, as per Geoghegan J.  
  
Around the world, political careers lurch precariously, and 'passing the 
buck' becomes the solution when the personal becomes political, 
especially if the personal in question is abortion. It seems that there is 
nothing quite like it to bring out depoliticisation by delegation strategies or 
the seeking of 'refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt'.57 
 
It is becoming increasingly clear that the PDLPA does not provide the clarity that is 
necessary to ensure that women in Ireland receive safe and appropriate maternal 
and reproductive health care. As we enter 2016, some 33 years after the insertion of 
40.3.3, there is hope that the Irish people may finally get an opportunity to vote to 
remove this clause from our Constitution and in doing so remove a key stumbling 
block to the achievement of full emancipation for Irish women thus ending a 
‘struggle … equivalent to the “heroic and unremitting struggle to regain the rightful 
independence of our Nation”’.58  
 
 
  
                                                        
57 Marie Fox and Therese Murphy ‘Irish Abortion: Seeking Refuge in a Jurisprudence of Doubt and 
Delegation’ (1992) 19(4) Journal of Law and Society 454-66. 
58 As per Fletcher J, below. 
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Fletcher J. 
The facts and issues 
The facts of this case are well known. The parents of a fourteen-year-old rape 
victim sought information from the Gardaí in an effort to support their daughter 
through the prosecution of the man who had assaulted her. In good faith, they asked if 
the DNA from an aborted foetus could be used as evidence in a rape trial. This 
question was referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions and then to the Attorney 
General. The Attorney General interpreted the question in a different way. He asked if 
he had a duty to try and stop the planned abortion given the obligations imposed by 
Article 40.3.3° of the Irish Constitution. The High Court held that there is such an 
obligation and that it extends to an injunction stopping Ms X and her parents 
travelling abroad for the purposes of securing abortion care. It falls to this Court to 
consider on appeal whether this is a sound legal interpretation.  
 Finlay C.J. has helpfully outlined the 22 grounds of appeal in this case and 
classified them as concerning four distinct legal issues, namely whether the trial judge 
erred in law and in fact because:  
1. The court does not have jurisdiction to enforce Article 40.3.3° in the 
absence of legislation 
2. Due regard to the pregnant woman’s life under Article 40.3.3° means that 
abortion is permissible in these circumstances 
3. Ms X’s right to liberty would be unjustifiably infringed 
4. Her right to receive services abroad under EC law makes an injunction 
unlawful  
Interpreting Article 40.3.3° 
In a sense, we are being asked whether the Attorney General’s belief that he was 
constitutionally obliged to seek an injunction against Ms X and her parents was a 
reasonable interpretation of Article 40.3.3°. That article, as adopted by the Eighth 
Amendment to the Constitution, provides: 
“The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to 
the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far 
as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right.” 
 
  
The terms of Article 40.3.3° have not been implemented by legislation.  The 
courts, state officials, healthcare providers and pregnant women have received no 
legislative statement from the Oireachtas as to how the constitutional balance between 
the right to life of the ‘unborn’ and the right to life of the pregnant woman, referred to 
in the Constitution as the ‘mother’, is to be drawn.   
Nonetheless the Supreme Court has twice declared that the right to life of the 
unborn in Article 40.3.3° is self-executing (The Attorney General (SPUC) v. Open 
Door Counselling [1988] IR 593, hereinafter Open Door, and SPUC v. Grogan 
[1989] IR 753, hereinafter Grogan) drawing on The State (Quinn) v. Ryan [1965] IR 
70 and The People v. Shaw [1982] IR 1 in so doing. This means that Article 40.3.3° is 
directly enforceable without the benefit of legislation. However, it does not tell us 
how exactly Article 40.3.3° should be enforced. That will have to be decided on a 
case-by-case basis in light of the particular facts and legal issues raised.  
In Open Door and Grogan the Supreme Court decided that it was justifiable to 
stop pregnancy counselling agencies and student unions from providing information 
on abortion services abroad. The courts were not asked to consider the legal issues in 
relation to any particular pregnancy. In this instance Ms X’s right to life, as protected 
by Article 40.3.3° in harmony with other provisions in the Constitution, is directly 
engaged. As Mr Rogers argued on behalf of Ms X and her parents, given the absence 
of legislation on how to balance these rights, which are in conflict in this instance, the 
court has to “make law on this point”. HLA Hart would have said this is one of those 
occasions when law “runs out” and judges are required to exercise discretion in 
making a decision (Hart, The Concept of Law, 1961, pp. 123-124).  
Impartiality 
In exercising judicial discretion, we are required to act with objectivity and 
impartiality in service of the people. O’Higgins C.J. said in Norris v. The Attorney 
General [1984] IR 36 (hereinafter Norris) at p. 53:-  
“The sole function of this Court, in a case of this nature, is to interpret 
the Constitution and the law and to declare with objectivity and impartiality 
the result of that interpretation on the claim being considered.”  
 
Judges are not automatically objective and impartial by virtue of being 
appointed judges. These are qualities of adjudication that we aspire towards and 
develop over time. One lesson I have learned along the way is that objectivity is more 
likely to be achieved by recognising the limits of judicial knowledge. I may have a 
great deal of legal expertise on human rights and principles of consent, but that does 
not mean I am expert in the significance of a particular rights protection for a person 
or group of persons. Ignoring certain life experiences, which may be unfamiliar to us, 
is likely to produce a rather partial account of law and life.  Being objective and 
impartial about interpreting Article 40.3.3° presents a particular challenge because 
there is so much silence and stigma about abortion experiences and decisions. In 
aiming for impartiality and objectivity we have to navigate uneven and obscured 
terrain as we come up against the partiality of our expertise and experience of legal 
rules and human life. We have to be wary of the potential for injustice, or legal 
hypocrisy as McCarthy J. might say (Norris, at p. 102), if we develop and apply the 
law as if ordinary women did not make abortion decisions every day.   
In order to become impartial – to rise above our partiality – we draw on a 
diversity of human experience and expertise. This is what the Court does when it calls 
on personal and expert evidence in seeking knowledge which is vital to legal, 
  
including constitutional, interpretation. But ‘rising above our partiality’ ought not to 
mean that we stay above legal process somehow, or that we adopt a bird’s eye view. 
Rather rising above our partiality has to be reflective. We try and imagine ourselves in 
the position of the litigant, and yet take a long view of the problem. In short, we 
judges regularly have to put ourselves ‘in other people’s shoes’ as we adjudicate and 
come to a legal ruling, often in haste and under pressure. We need to “assess the 
actual and potential effects” of this injunction on this appellant, as Henchy J. said 
obiter in Norris at p. 69.  
Sometimes judicial empathy is helped along by the familiarity of certain 
experiences. In this context, abortion seems such an unfamiliar experience that it is 
difficult for judges to put themselves in the shoes of Ms X or of other women who 
decide that abortion is the best resolution for them. And yet, we know that many 
thousands of Irish women have had abortions before and after the Eighth Amendment. 
Indeed folklorists and historians tell us that St Brigid herself performed an abortion at 
a time when restoring a woman’s menses and preventing the development of a 
pregnancy was not seen as a moral or legal sin. We know that unsafe abortion has 
been a feature of Irish women’s lives, particularly during World War II as the 
traditional escape path to England became difficult to access (Jackson, Outside the 
Jurisdiction: Irish Women Seeking Abortion Abroad, in Gender in Irish Society, 
Galway University Press, 1987), and including the 1939, 1945 and 1956 convictions 
of midwife and abortionist Mamie Cadden. 
The courts have been saved the experience of dealing with unlawful abortion 
practice since then because women have travelled to safe and legal services 
elsewhere. More stories are surfacing everyday about the ways in which pregnant 
women have been mistreated and undervalued as some were sent away to Magdalene 
laundries and had their children taken from them. We do not have the benefit of solid 
research evidence on women’s experiences of and reasons for pregnancy and 
abortion. But objectivity and impartiality cannot be achieved by ignoring this 
common knowledge of women’s struggle to gain reproductive self-determination and 
full citizenship, a struggle which I believe will one day be seen as equivalent to the 
“heroic and unremitting struggle to regain the rightful independence of our Nation”, 
as acknowledged in the Preamble. 
  Another feature of this case, which makes the terrain uneven and difficult in 
the search for impartiality, is the different public roles and responsibilities of the 
parties in this case. I cannot fail but to observe that this case comes before us because 
one family called on the Guards for help in their time of need. They did not receive 
the help they asked for but instead the full power of the state through the Attorney 
General’s request for an injunction was brought to bear on their situation. As a result, 
although their anonymity has been maintained, they have had to endure this 
threatening disruption to their care plan for Ms X while the international and national 
media pour over the details of her case. I for one find it extremely troubling that the 
effect, whatever the intention, of the Attorney General’s actions as guardian of the 
Constitution has been to expose ordinary people to coercive scrutiny and disruption, 
when surely our first intuition is that a prudent, just and charitable Constitution 
requires the opposite.  
I am also conscious that this particular family has endured this response while 
showing remarkable faith in and openness with the legal system. Given what we now 
know about the past treatment of women such as Joanne Hayes by the authorities, I 
am mindful of the possibility that Article 40.3.3° could be used to license invasive 
treatment of women and their loved ones, some of whom may have good reason to be 
  
less trusting of the legal system. As we judges strive for objectivity and impartiality in 
our constitutional interpretation we have an obligation to address gaps in our 
knowledge, and to consider the effects of uneven legal power on the parties before us.  
Harmony 
In exercising my judicial discretion to interpret Article 40.3.3° I will apply the 
doctrine of harmonious interpretation (Quinn’s Supermarket Ltd v. Attorney General 
[1972] IR 1). Henchy J. explained the doctrine in these terms in The People v. O'Shea 
[1982] IR 384 at p. 426:-  
“Any single constitutional right or power is but a component in an 
ensemble of interconnected and interacting provisions which must be brought 
into play as part of a larger composition, and which must be given such an 
integrated interpretation as will fit it harmoniously into the general 
constitutional order and modulation. It may be said of a constitution, more 
than of any other legal instrument, that 'the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth 
life'.” 
 
The requirement that the state defend and vindicate the right to life of the 
unborn with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, needs to be interpreted 
firstly, in light of the commitments in the constitutional Preamble (see Walsh J. in 
McGee v. The Attorney General [1974] IR 284 (hereinafter McGee); O’Higgins C.J. 
in State (Healy) v. Donoghue [1976] IR 325), and secondly in light of the other 
provisions of the Constitution, including women’s fundamental rights under Article 
40 (see Budd J. in McGee at p. 322).  
The Preamble, in language which is similar to many other constitutional and 
human rights documents across the world, commits to promotion of “the common 
good, with due observance of Prudence, Justice and Charity, so that the dignity and 
freedom of the individual may be assured”. The difficulty of course lies in deciding 
the proper legal meaning of “the common good”, “prudence” “justice”, “charity” 
“dignity”, and “freedom”, among other constitutional matters, how to weigh them 
when they come into conflict with each other, and which mechanisms and standards 
are appropriate in achieving these constitutional values. Although working out the 
detail falls to the legislature and the courts, it is clear that the Constitution envisages a 
people with dignified, free and just lives. Dignity, freedom and justice require that 
individuals be enabled to make their own lives, apart and together, subject to an 
obligation not to harm others. As Thompson saw, communities of shared power are 
vital to remedying the uneven distribution of happiness and enabling everyone to 
become “fabricators of [their] own destiny” (Labour Rewarded, Hunt and Clarke, 
1827, at p. 118).  
It is true of course that the Preamble also makes reference to the existence of 
God and acknowledges the people’s obligation to “our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ”. 
This constitutional language has been drawn on, most notably in Norris at p. 64, to 
declare the people’s intention to “adopt a Constitution consistent with that conviction 
and with Christian beliefs”. In Norris, the Supreme Court found that the impugned 
buggery and indecent assault offences were constitutional because they conformed 
with long established laws “which had existed for hundreds of years prohibiting 
unnatural sexual conduct which Christian teaching held to be gravely sinful”.  
However, coherence with Christian teaching was not sufficient to save the 
legislation prohibiting the importation of contraceptives in McGee. Therefore, 
conformity with Christian teaching is not, in itself, sufficient to find legislation or 
  
legal actions constitutional. In other words, the truth of the matter is that the Preamble 
lends itself to a variety of possible ways of harmonising these commitments to the 
dignity and freedom of the individual, to the common good, and to the Christian and 
democratic nature of the State. Therefore, I shall attempt to do justice to objectivity 
and impartiality by explaining how I approach the different legal pathways which 
harmonious interpretation provides.  
Text 
Precedent and practice tell us that there are three key elements to 
constitutional interpretation: text, evidence and craft. Each element will be in play as 
a judge considers the constitutional text, assesses evidence and crafts her judgment as 
a contribution to living law. Depending on the circumstances, some elements will be 
more emphasised or obvious than others in particular cases. For example, although 
constitutional scholars usually emphasise the innovative textual interpretation in Ryan 
v. Attorney General [1965] IR 294 (hereinafter Ryan) most of the judgment itself is 
actually concerned with the evidence on fluoridation in weighing whether there was 
any infringement of bodily integrity. Each element contributes to the ebb and flow of 
constitutional interpretation and to the judicial carving out of a legal pathway along 
the constitutional shoreline.  
The doctrine of harmonious interpretation is one kind of textual approach. 
Harmonious interpretation reflects a coherence approach to textual meaning in 
holding that it is impossible to derive the meaning of one piece of text without 
considering how it coheres with the whole. In the process, the meanings of some 
words are so popularly accepted that they become common sense and are taken as the 
plain meaning of words. This is what the literal rule of interpretation captures. It is not 
that the words speak for themselves. Rather the audience is so familiar with the words 
and there is such a degree of consensus that the meaning becomes plain. But as 
authors such as Joyce have shown us, plain meanings become less plain when words 
are re-arranged and their usual pattern disrupted. In a sense, the adoption of the 
Eighth Amendment was a significant moment in the disruption of the plain meaning 
of key constitutional terms. The generation of this new constitutional term the unborn 
has re-arranged and disrupted the plain meaning of birth as the moment when legal 
personhood and rights normally begin. It falls to the courts to respond to this legal 
innovation and determine the constitutional meaning of the unborn as a new kind of 
rights-bearer, even as it is still a piece of the constitutional ensemble.  
Evidence 
The second element of constitutional interpretation is an evidence-based 
approach. In Ryan O’Dálaigh J., in the Supreme Court (affirming Kenny J. in the 
High Court), held that there would be times when constitutional meaning cannot be 
determined in the absence of evidence-based knowledge. He was referring not just to 
the material factual evidence, which gives rise to the legal issues in every case before 
a court, but also to the research-based evidence, which may be necessary for 
determining whether an action is integrity-violating and unconstitutional. Ryan then is 
authority for the role of evidence-based interpretation in assisting a court to decide 
where the threshold for a constitutional violation is and whether it has been met.  
The evidence considered included evidence of Mrs Ryan’s views and wishes 
in relation to her and her children’s ingestion of fluoridated water and evidence of 
scientific research into the question of whether fluoridation could be harmful. In 
circumstances where there was a conflict between Mrs Ryan’s evidence and that of 
the scientific establishment on the question of the harmfulness of fluoridation and 
  
related violation of bodily integrity, the Court relied on the scientific evidence and 
found that there was no violation of bodily integrity because there was no objective 
evidence that fluoridation caused any harm (beyond some discoloration of teeth some 
cases).  
Just as the court in Ryan had to rely on public health evidence in order to 
answer the question as to whether fluoridation was dangerous, so a court may rely on 
public health evidence, among other things, in determining whether pregnancy can be 
dangerous. Many pregnancies in modern times will be harmless and indeed beneficial 
to the women that carry them. They may not even require medical attention. But some 
pregnancies may be harmful for women because they threaten their health, dignity 
and well-being.  
Furthermore, evidence of pregnancy’s effects is likely to distinguish it from 
fluoridation in at least two ways. Pregnancy asks a lot of a woman’s body and is 
therefore a greater incursion on bodily integrity than the ingestion of fluoride. 
Secondly, the pregnant woman’s subjective experience of pregnancy has a known 
impact on the objective question of whether a pregnancy is harmful or not. Therefore 
a court may be entitled to give more weight to the wishes and concerns of a pregnant 
person vis-a-vis the general scientific evidence about pregnancy, than it would to the 
wishes and concerns of a woman who feels her body to be violated by the ingestion of 
fluoride, vis-a-vis the general scientific evidence about the effects of fluorides.  
  In this case before us, the High Court has appropriately relied on personal, 
parental and professional evidence of an individual risk of self-destruction as that 
goes to the primary legal issue before us. Here I am making the broader legal point 
that there are likely to be occasions when more general evidence about pregnancy, or 
other constitutional matters, will be helpful and even necessary for interpretative 
purposes. While Ryan emphasized the need for scientific public health evidence, as 
well as personal evidence, in evaluating the question of bodily harm, Norris required 
the submission of many different kinds of evidence in order to consider the question 
as to whether continued criminalisation of buggery and indecent assault could be 
constitutionally justifiable in the common good. The Norris court, whose judgment 
that continued criminalisation was justified is on its way to the European Court of 
Human Rights, heard from sociological, theological and psychiatric experts as well as 
from Mr. Norris himself.  
As Henchy and McCarthy J.J. point out in dissent, a majority of the Norris 
court went against all of the evidence, as this evidence was uniformly of the view that 
criminalisation was not in the common good. Rather the majority found that 
criminalisation was justified on grounds of conformity with Christian teaching and 
given the Christian nature of the state. The aspect of Norris which concerns me here, 
however, is not the decision on criminalisation, but the interpretative rule which was 
relied on in producing that decision. A wide range of social, moral, medical and 
personal evidence may well be relevant in deciding whether a particular form of 
criminalisation is constitutional. I would add that evidence from the person affected is 
particularly important when fundamental personal rights are at issue.  
Craft 
The third key aspect of constitutional interpretation is the need for judicial 
craft itself, particularly given the status of our Constitution as a “living document”. 
McCarthy J. expressed the point eloquently in Norris at 96 when he said:  
 
  
“I find it philosophically impossible to carry out the necessary exercise of 
applying what I might believe to be the thinking of 1937 to the demands of 
1983… Suffice it to say that the Constitution is a living document; its life 
depends not merely upon itself but upon the people from whom it came and to 
whom it gives varying rights and duties.” 
  
McCarthy J. made these comments in dissent but they capture an approach to 
constitutional interpretation, which is supported by significant constitutional 
precedent (cf O’Higgins C.J. in The State (Healy) v. O’Donoghue at p. 347 and 
Kenny J. in Ryan at pp. 312-3). 
 The metaphorical depiction of the Constitution as a living document draws our 
attention to the subtleties involved in reading the tone and texture of law. This can be 
particularly demanding of judicial attentiveness when there are significant silences in 
relation to constitutional matters. In short, judicial craft has to be attentive to the fact 
that we know very little about pregnant women’s decision-making and that significant 
stigma and stereotyping attach to women’s practices of determining their own 
reproductive lives. It may take considerable experience of drawing out the 
significance of silences and discordant tones in order for constitutional interpretation 
to be crafted in a way that preserves democratic values and promotes public trust. We 
would do well to remember that our constitution, indeed our legal system, has been 
brought into being with joy and with pain. When judges are tasked with the job of 
giving life to law, of caring for its intricacies and deciding what to do with its rough 
edges, they must tread gently on the people’s dreams.   
Article 40.3.3° limits reproductive choices and denies abortion as a personal right 
I turn now to the evaluation of Costello J.’s test - whether there is a real and 
imminent danger to unborn life justifying the injunction and whether the risk that the 
girl might take her own life is of the same order as the risk of abortion to the unborn - 
and the clarification of the rules by which such an evaluation will be done, in light of 
the above. The text of Article 40.3.3° does not refer to abortion specifically. Rather 
Article 40.3.3° identifies the unborn as the bearer of a right to life. It imposes a 
positive obligation on the state to defend and vindicate that right “as far as 
practicable”. It imposes an obligation on the state to have “due regard to the equal 
right to life of the mother” when defending and vindicating the unborn’s right.   
 The language of Article 40.3.3° raises several questions. The unborn is a new 
constitutional term, whose plain meaning is not yet clear. For example, it is not clear 
at which point exactly in the development of pregnancy that the unborn comes into 
being and has a constitutional right to life. Is implantation enough? Secondly, the 
language of Article 40.3.3° implies that the positive obligation to defend and 
vindicate the unborn’s right to life is not an absolute one. This position is consistent 
with the other fundamental rights in the Constitution, which are generally regarded as 
being non-absolute and capable of limitation in the common good and given the rights 
of others (cf Ryan). It is also consistent with the common law position on the right to 
life, which does not normally protect life absolutely, and recognises that there may be 
circumstances in which the ending of human life is justifiable.  
Does the particularity of Article 40.3.3° imply any other particular legal 
considerations? When will it be impracticable to defend and vindicate the unborn? If 
an unborn has a significant anomaly, e.g. anencephaly, and is unlikely to survive past 
birth, do such circumstances make it impracticable to defend and vindicate the 
unborn? Finally, the text raises questions about the appropriate threshold for due 
  
regard to the equal right to life of the mother. When is “due regard” shown to the 
pregnant woman’s life? Does a threshold which requires a risk to a woman’s health to 
become a risk to her life before action is taken violate due regard? What difference do 
the particular circumstances of pregnancy make to the evaluation of due regard? 
 In order to answer these questions we need to consider how the other 
provisions of the Constitution may help in providing a harmonious interpretation of 
Article 40.3.3°, we need to consider the personal, social, medical, and philosophical 
evidence which is necessary for determining its meaning, and we need to come to a 
prudent, just and charitable judgment about which interpretation is best in light of 
living law. Before we do so, I think it worth noting that this case presents an 
interesting example of an occasion when the purpose of the amendment will be 
particularly helpful in defining constitutional meaning (cf Costello J. The Attorney 
General v. Paperlink [1984] ILRM 373, at p. 385).  Abortion was a criminal offence 
under the Offences against the Person Act 1861 s. 58 when the Eighth Amendment 
was adopted.  The amendment did not change the legal landscape by making abortion 
unlawful. There was also significant obiter commentary implying that abortion was 
unconstitutional (Budd J. in McGee at p. 335; Walsh J. in G. v. An Bord Uchtála 
[1980] IR 32 at p. 69; O’Higgins C.J. in Norris at p. 64). The Eighth Amendment 
made constitutional protection of unborn life explicit, but such protection was implicit 
before 1983.  
That is not to say that this constitutional protection had ever been tested in 
such a way as to require the elaboration of its specific remit, nor to doubt that 
whatever constitutional protection existed would of course always have to be weighed 
with other constitutional interests, including women’s fundamental rights and the 
pursuit of the common good. The addition of the right to life of the unborn to the 
constitutional ensemble means that any court would have to take that protection into 
consideration when faced with a particular question about the permissibility of 
abortion. As a result, it would be impossible, or at least highly improbable, for a court 
to find that abortion was available to women as of right. Abortion, as such, certainly 
abortion on request, is not something that can be legalised in this jurisdiction under 
Article 40.3.3°. Therefore, Ms X does not have legal permission to have an abortion 
on grounds of a right to abortion simpliciter because this is exactly what Article 
40.3.3° prevents.  
Article 40.3.3° permits abortion where this vindicates a woman’s right to life 
Nonetheless, as both counsel accepted, Article 40.3.3° does anticipate that a 
woman may have an abortion in some circumstances, notably when her right to life is 
at risk. Counsel differ however, as to the test that should be applied, with the Attorney 
General upholding the test that Costello J. applied, where the woman’s life is in 
imminent and inevitable danger of death. Mr Murray argues, on behalf of the 
appellants, for a test of real and substantial risk to the woman’s life.  
 One of the difficulties in determining the meaning of Article 40.3.3° according 
to the doctrine of harmonious interpretation is that we have a conflict in constitutional 
rights. One approach to the question of how to determine the balance between the 
conflicting rights of woman and unborn is the hierarchical approach, or the “hierarchy 
of constitutional norms” per McCarthy J. in Murray v. Ireland [1991] ILRM 465, at p. 
476, with the abstract right to life at the top of the hierarchy. Precedent seems to 
favour such a hierarchical approach to a conflict between a right to life and another 
constitutional right, but only when a harmonious interpretation is not possible (see 
  
McGee, The State (Healy) v. Donoghue [1976] IR 325 and The People v. Shaw [1982] 
IR 1). 
But I do not believe that precedent requires the hierarchical approach, for the 
following reasons. Although the majority in Shaw claimed to be taking a hierarchical 
approach, the judgment actually involved a reconciliation of conflicting rights. The 
Court of Criminal Appeal (O'Higgins C.J., Finlay P. and McMahon J.) was satisfied  
"that, if it needs to be excused, the interference with the applicant's 
right to liberty is amply excused by the circumstance that the paramount and 
primary purpose for continuing his detention was the hope of saving the life of 
the woman from imminent peril"(at p. 23).  
 
In other words, the violation of liberty was justified in concrete circumstances 
where that violation had a reasonable chance of saving the life of a woman who was 
in danger. In circumstances where there seems to be a conflict between what a court 
says and what it does, we are entitled to follow what it does i.e. reconcile rights which 
conflict in particular concrete circumstances, rather than apply an abstract hierarchy 
of rights. 
Secondly, the judgment in Shaw cannot be taken to mean that an immutable 
list of precedence of rights can be formulated. The right to life of one person (as in 
Shaw's case) was held to be superior to the right to liberty of another but, quite 
clearly, the right to life might not be the paramount right in every circumstance. If, for 
instance, it were necessary for a mother to defend her daughter by attacking a person 
who was assaulting that daughter, and if she killed that person in the process, I have 
no doubt but that the right of the girl to bodily integrity would rank higher than the 
right to life of the person assaulting her. It may be justifiable or excusable for one 
person to kill another when that act is done in defence of another, subject to 
proportionate use of violence. In other words, it will not always be the case that a 
right to life takes precedence over another constitutional right, such as the right to 
liberty, or to bodily integrity. The reconciliation approach is a better fit with what the 
majority actually reasoned in Shaw. It also has the merit of enabling a fact-specific 
case-by-case approach to rights conflict.  
Before elaborating how the various interests at stake in Article 40.3.3° should 
be reconciled, I need to address another preliminary issue of interpretation. How 
should the court approach Article 40.3.3°’s reference to “equality” between the “life” 
of the unborn and the “life” of the pregnant woman? Are there any significant 
differences between each form of life that should be taken into consideration when 
determining equal treatment? Clearly, as I have already stated, the purpose of Article 
40.3.3° was to make any implicit commitment to protecting a foetal right to life 
explicit. But I find it difficult to countenance that the purpose of Article 40.3.3° could 
have been to devalue the life that sustains the unborn, much less to put it in danger. 
There is a substantive difference, one that has been long recognized by law, between 
the two lives. The right of Ms X here is a right to a life in being. The right of the 
unborn is to a life contingent, contingent on survival in the womb until successful 
delivery. It is not a question of setting one above the other but rather of vindicating, as 
far as practicable, the right to life of the pregnant woman, whilst vindicating, as far as 
practicable, the right to life of the unborn.   
Why does this matter? It matters because we need to take the value of 
constitutional life into account when deciding how to treat the unborn and the 
pregnant woman as bearers of a right to life (in harmony with the other commitments 
in the Constitution). For the pregnant woman this means that we need to take her 
  
needs seriously as a human being who requires the basics of life to survive – oxygen, 
food, shelter, rest. But it also means that we need to take into account her life interests 
as a creative, cultural human being. Moreover, if we value the creative role which 
women’s bodies play in bringing new people into being, then we need to show legal 
respect for that role.  
 For the unborn, the situation is different. The unborn is a biological human 
and a social being, but not yet creative, sentient and conscious. Foetal dependence on 
the pregnant woman for the basics of life – oxygen, food, shelter and rest – in order 
for it to become creative, sentient, conscious and capable of independent interaction 
with others, is unique and vital. To compel a pregnant woman to provide that 
sustenance to a foetus within her body devalues the significance of pregnancy. To 
treat the unborn and the pregnant woman as if they were the same forms of life would 
be disrespectful and dignity-violating because it misrecognises each kind of life.  
 The equality guarantee in Art 40.1 recognises that differences in capacity, 
physical, moral and social function matter. As philosophers since Aristotle have 
recognised, equality is not achieved by treating different entities as if they are the 
same. Given the substantive differences between an unborn life and a pregnant 
woman’s life and given the need to treat the bearer of a right to life with dignity and 
freedom and in light of the Christian and democratic nature of the state, it is 
permissible in principle to authorise the ending of unborn life in order to respect the 
pregnant woman’s life.  
 Further support for this differentiation between the conflicting rights to life 
may be found in the constitutional text’s explicit recognition of a pregnant woman’s 
personal rights as distinct from the unborn’s right to life. Ms X has a right to bodily 
integrity, a right to liberty, a right to privacy, a right to be free of inhuman and 
degrading treatment and a right to equality, among other interests. In short, her right 
to life is to a ‘rightful’ life that is to a life whose specific texture and tone is protected 
and enabled by these other rights. The unborn’s right to life is to ‘bare’ biological life. 
That right may impose an obligation on others to support it, but when there is a 
conflict, the woman’s fuller, rightful life may merit more legal weight than the 
unborn’s bare life.  
 Ms X’s right to life ought to be interpreted in light of the principle established 
in The State (C) v. Frawley [1976] IR 365, at p. 372, that the Executive “may not, 
without justification or necessity, expose the health of that person to risk or danger”. 
For this reason, I find it impossible to draw sharp lines between life and health. 
Indeed Kenny J himself did not make any bright line distinctions between life and 
bodily integrity, or between life and health, when he was considering whether a 
violation of bodily integrity had taken place in Ryan. Rather he asked whether the 
plea that fluoridation was dangerous amounted to a plea that the Oireachtas had failed 
to respect the rights to life and bodily integrity (emphasis added).  
 McGee established a right to marital privacy, and the Eighth Amendment was 
adopted in part to prevent that right to marital privacy grounding an explicit right to 
abortion, as happened in the U.S. case of Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The right 
to marital privacy is not relevant to Ms X given she is not married. However, the right 
to marital privacy is one particular instance of a more general right to privacy in one’s 
intimate life. She has a right to be free from unnecessary and excessive scrutiny in her 
intimate life, including her reproductive life. This is a not an absolute right (cf Ryan), 
but it is a right which certainly needs to be weighed in the balance when deciding the 
extent of any duty to sustain foetal life under Article 40.3.3°. 
  
Ms X also has a constitutional right to liberty. One of the issues before the 
Court is whether stopping Ms X from travelling for an abortion is a disproportionate 
violation of her constitutional right to liberty. Counsel maintained that the right to 
travel, as recognised in The State (M) v. The Attorney General [1979] IR 73 at p. 80 
and in Ryan at p. 311, was an aspect of the right to liberty. I find it difficult to see why 
the right to liberty is only being considered in relation to the issue of travel out of the 
jurisdiction and not in relation to the issue of continuing or ending a pregnancy. It’s as 
if counsel cannot imagine liberty applying to pregnancy as distinct from travel. If her 
legal right to travel to another jurisdiction and have an abortion is being contemplated 
as an aspect of her right to liberty, then why not a legal right to have a pregnancy 
terminated on Irish soil? If the state cannot, without just cause, use its coercive power 
to stop her from leaving its territory, then surely the state cannot use its coercive 
power to stop her from leaving pregnancy, without just cause. Preserving the bare 
biological life of the unborn against the will of a pregnant woman who sustains that 
unborn with her conscious and sentient life, may not always be just cause, particularly 
when the woman’s life is at risk.  
Ms X has a right to be held equal as a person before the law under Article 
40.1°. To deny women a say in their own reproductive futures treats them as if their 
views, wishes and feelings do not matter. Telling someone that her views, wishes and 
feelings about her own life do not matter is a denial of the very essence of 
personhood, a denial which men, who also contribute to reproduction, are not required 
to accept. It is 167 years since Irish philosophers Thompson and Wheeler criticised 
society for encouraging women to repress their sexuality and for denying women civil 
rights on the basis of their capacity to bear children (Appeal of One-half of the Human 
Race, Women, Against the Pretensions of the Other Half, Men, to Retain Them in 
Political, and Thence in Civil and Domestic Slavery, Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, 
Brown and Green, 1825). Surely as this court considers how to balance the right to 
life of the unborn against the right to life of the pregnant woman, it cannot allow the 
right to life of the unborn to become the means by which women’s equal personhood 
is denied? Such an outcome would be unjust and unreasonable, if not necessarily 
arbitrary, and therefore a violation of the equality guarantee (see O’B v. S [1984] IR 
316). 
 Given the implications of women’s constitutional rights, the social value of 
their voluntary reproductive contributions, and their status as persons of equal value 
and individuals bearing dignity and freedom, I cannot accept that there is a clear 
hierarchy of rights with ‘bare biological life’ at the top. Rather I would say that the 
first part of the test for lawful abortion is whether there is a risk to the pregnant 
woman’s rightful life that is, to a life lived with bodily integrity, privacy, liberty and 
equality. The evidence presented to the court by Ms X’s mother, by the Garda and by 
the clinical psychologist was clear and unchallenged in finding that there was a risk of 
self-destruction. While it was not possible to hear from Ms X directly in this instance, 
the evidence provided the Court with a clear account of her views, wishes and 
feelings in relation to this pregnancy. Assessments of the violation of fundamental 
personal rights should give significant weight to the person most affected. The 
grounds for a lawful abortion on this first element of the Article 40.3.3° test are more 
than made out.  
  
Article 40.3.3° permits abortion when vindicating the right to life of the unborn is an 
impracticable burden on a woman’s life 
The next question for the Court is when does the right to life of the unborn 
justify the state in acting to prevent abortion even if a woman’s right to life is 
engaged. Our common and constitutional law recognizes that there are circumstances 
in which the ordinary right to life is justifiably infringed, notably in self-defence. 
Secondly, the value of life does not usually justify compelling people to take 
extraordinary measures to sustain someone else’s life against their own will (McFall 
v. Shimp 10 Pa D & C 3d 90; July 26, 1978), or against their own interest where their 
will cannot be expressed. The legal protection of the ordinary right to life 
acknowledges that life may be justifiably taken in self-defence, or denied the 
sustenance of involuntarily donated organs, blood and tissue. Therefore, the starting 
point for determining the scope of an unborn’s right to life is that it at least has similar 
limits.  
 Article 40.3.3° refers to the right to life of the unborn, it does not refer to all 
the rights which a born person has. The text seems to imply a distinction between the 
unborn as the bearer of right to life as far as practicable, and the born as the bearer of 
a rightful life, a life of rights to bodily integrity etc. Secondly, there are good 
evidence-based reasons why the unborn’s right to life ought to be recognised as more 
limited that the ordinary right to life. Unborn life has particular characteristics – non-
viable, non-sentient, developmental – which differentiate it from the ordinary right to 
life and the obligations such a right can impose on others. Unborn life is notoriously 
fragile and contingent, with one in five pregnancies ending in spontaneous 
miscarriage. Nature itself decides that a significant number of unborns will not 
survive pregnancy.  
 There is extensive medical evidence that before viability (approx. 24 weeks 
gestation), the foetus could not be capable of sustaining life without the support of the 
pregnant woman because its lungs are not developed to the point of being capable of 
resuscitation. The only one who can assist this life in sustaining it to viability is the 
pregnant woman. This is not the same as born life, which can be assisted by anyone. 
There are times when an unborn has significant developmental anomalies, such an 
anencephaly, literally ‘without a brain’, which mean that even if a child is born alive 
and capable of drawing its own breath, it will not be able to survive long. In such 
circumstances, it would simply be futile to recognise unborn life, which cannot 
sustain itself or cannot be technologically sustained, as imposing obligations of 
sustenance on a pregnant woman.  
 Unborn human life is in the process of becoming a legal person, an important 
legal and social process, which ought to be supported. But to treat the process of 
becoming a person as if becoming has already been achieved misrecognises the nature 
of becoming. Women’s contributions in pregnancy are necessary for the process of 
becoming a legal and social person. Women have undertaken them voluntarily with 
joy and happiness, as well as sometimes with fear and anxiety. To compel these 
contributions by law is to do a terrible dis-service to the history and future of 
voluntary reproduction.   
 In summary, where the unborn is unlikely to be born alive, implementing the 
right to life of the unborn and stopping a woman from having an abortion is likely to 
be an impracticable burden on a woman’s rightful life. Where the unborn is non-
viable or non-sentient, preventing an abortion, which would reduce harm to the 
viable, sentient pregnant woman, is likely to be an impracticable and disproportionate 
burden on a woman’s rightful life. Preventing an abortion, which would implement 
  
the reproductive wishes of a pregnant woman, could logically be seen as an 
impracticable burden on a rightful life of dignity and freedom. Who but she can judge 
whether pregnancy and motherhood fit her life plan, and all the dreams and hopes for 
the future that fill that plan? My conscience tells me that this life’s voluntary 
contribution to the common good ought to be respected. But I accept that the effect of 
the Eighth Amendment is to limit women’s reproductive choices, qualify their 
constitutional dignity and freedom, and deny them access to abortion as of personal 
right.  
 There was no evidence presented to the court on the material scope of the 
unborn’s right to life. Therefore, the extent to which it is practicable to implement a 
right to life of the unborn in light of foetal anomalies, viability or sentience, was not 
tested or proved fully. It remains for the Legislature, or another case before another 
court, to debate or test those issues and establish binding rules thereon. Although the 
issues of viability and sentience were not argued fully before the court, this was 
because the legal assumption was that the unborn was neither viable nor sentient 
given the early stage of pregnancy. Therefore, the second stage of the test for lawful 
and constitutional abortion has been made out on the evidence in this case. Ms X is 
clearly distressed, suffering and being harmed by the continuation of the pregnancy, 
whereas there is no evidence that the unborn’s life is one of distress and suffering 
since it is incapable of feeling. In these circumstances, sustaining the right to life of 
the unborn imposes an impracticable burden on the woman’s rightful life and she is 
legally entitled to withdraw her sustenance of the unborn and to any necessary 
assistance in doing so.  
Article 40.3.3° permits consideration of the particular circumstances of pregnancy 
e.g. maturity, vulnerability, experience of rape or assault, when deciding whether a 
particular pregnancy has become too burdensome 
The test adopted by Costello J. is too narrow for another reason. It is 
insufficiently attentive to life circumstances that may contribute to a pregnancy 
becoming too burdensome. Circumstances or conditions, which make the pregnancy 
more difficult to bear, are relevant to the ‘impracticable burden’ test. Indeed, youth or 
experience of sexual assault, are circumstances which prima facie may make a 
particular pregnancy burdensome enough to justify an abortion. They are likely to 
make a pregnancy harmful for that woman in the sense of causing her pain and 
suffering. In some circumstances such pain and suffering may amount to inhuman and 
degrading treatment, and be in breach of her constitutional right to be free of such 
treatment, as established in The State (C) v. Frawley [1976] IR 365 at p. 374. The 
woman’s views as to her experience of pregnancy will be pivotal in such instances 
however. Some women would rather continue a pregnancy even if young and 
distressed, or if pregnant as a result of non-consensual sex. This is another example of 
how the subjective experience of human conditions such as pregnancy, has a material 
bearing on objective assessment, including assessment as to whether someone is 
being degraded.   
Kenny J.’s obiter comments in Ryan, as approved by the Supreme Court, 
provide support for taking the particular circumstances of the pregnant woman into 
account with a view to deciding whether a pregnancy is too burdensome on her life. 
When he was assessing whether the effect of fluoridation was a possible infringement 
of bodily integrity, he specifically mentioned different groups of people, namely the 
old, the young, the sick and the healthy. There was no reason on the evidence in that 
case to find that the young or the sick were in danger, even if the healthy were not. 
  
But Kenny J. clearly contemplated a situation where the bodily integrity of the young 
and sick could be violated even though that of the healthy was not.  Similarly, if a 
pregnant woman is vulnerable or distressed because of her immaturity, ill health, or 
experience of assault or violence, carrying a pregnancy may be more burdensome for 
her and more likely to violate her rights to life and to bodily integrity, as compared 
with a woman who is mature, healthy and free from experiences of violence. In this 
instance, it is clear that Ms X’s youth, suicidal feelings and experience of rape 
contribute to her pregnancy being impracticably burdensome and mean that her right 
to life would be violated if she was denied access to abortion.  
This Court is aware that rape victims are often reticent to report their 
experiences to the police partly as a result of the trauma usually caused by rape itself, 
and partly because of a fear that they will not be believed. The Court has a 
responsibility to develop its legal rules in a way which supports rape victims in 
accessing justice. For the purposes of assessing whether a particular pregnancy may 
be terminated because it imposes an impracticable burden on a woman’s rightful life, 
any claim that the pregnancy resulted from non-consensual sex ought to be assumed 
to be truthful, unless evidence rebutting such an assumption is presented in court.  
Article 40.3.3° imposes public duties to support pregnant life 
This Court has focused on the obligations which Article 40.3.3° imposes on 
the pregnant woman in relation to the sustenance of unborn life, and the 
circumstances in which those obligations may legitimately end. Article 40.3.3° raises 
another set of obligations however, as it envisages a positive role for the State in the 
vindication of the right to life of the unborn through the provision of the necessary 
agencies to help, counsel and encourage pregnant women in making a decision in 
accordance with the Constitution and the law. In Norris at p. 103, McCarthy J. spoke 
of the right to life of the unborn as “a sacred trust to which all the organs of 
government must lend their support”. If the Eighth Amendment had not been adopted, 
it is certainly arguable that compelling a woman to bear all the responsibility of that 
public trust would be a breach of the constitutional values of dignity and freedom.  
Since the Eighth Amendment was adopted, a woman bears the lion’s share of 
that responsibility since her reproductive choices are curtailed. In these 
circumstances, it is all the more necessary for the state to play a positive role in 
sharing some reproductive responsibility and supporting women. To do otherwise 
would be to completely privatise the public duty to defend and vindicate the right to 
life of the unborn, by locating all responsibility on the individual pregnant woman.  
Decision 
I have not addressed the issue of E.U. law because I do not consider it 
necessary, since the issues can be resolved in a manner that is consistent with freedom 
of movement on the basis of domestic law. But for the sake of clarity I agree with 
McCarthy J. on that issue.  
 The injunction is unjustified and the Attorney General was not constitutionally 
required to act in the way that he did. Ms X has a right to abortion in the Irish health 
care system on the ground that her pregnancy imposes an impracticable burden on her 
rightful life. This is a practicable and proportionate interference with the right to life 
of the unborn, given the distinction between a life contingent and a life in being and 
given the aggravating circumstances which make Ms X’s pregnancy particularly 
burdensome. The state has a positive duty to support her in accessing that abortion 
care, in terms that respond attentively to her situation as a woman who is pregnant 
  
through non-consensual sex and as a young person whose welfare may require added 
support, subject to her consent.  
